The Fragile Bloom of Democracy by Stotzky, Irwin P.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 44 Number 1 Article 3 
9-1-1989 
The Fragile Bloom of Democracy 
Irwin P. Stotzky 
University of Miami School of Law, istotzky@law.miami.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Irwin P. Stotzky, The Fragile Bloom of Democracy, 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 105 (1989) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol44/iss1/3 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
ESSAYS
The Fragile Bloom of Democracy
IRWIN P. STOTZKY*
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 105
II. A GLIMPSE OF ARGENTINE HISTORY .................................... 109
III. PROFESSOR NINO'S PROPOSED SOLUTIONS .................... ......... 114
IV. RECENT EVENTS IN ARGENTINA ........................................ 120
A. Election Results ............................................ 120
B. Econom ic D ata .................................................... 122
C . The M ilitary ...................................................... 123
D . The People ....................................................... 124
E. The New Governm ent .............................................. 124
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 126
To abolish the fences of laws between men-as tyranny does-
means to take away man's liberties and destroy freedom as a living
political reality; for. the space between men as it is hedged in by
laws, is the living space of freedom.
Hannah Arendt'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, a number of Latin American nations have
embarked on a profound experiment. They are attempting to change
their political systems from authoritarian, dictatorial regimes, usually
in the form of the all too familiar military dictator or military junta,
to constitutional democracies. This transition from dictatorship to
democracy is a fragile process, and it has met with varying degrees of
success. Latin Americans have found that the responsibilities of
democracy can be overwhelming. There are more choices in a society
that yearns to be free and none of them are easy. Indeed, the wrong
choice can often prove fatal to the democracy.
One of the most difficult decisions facing these budding democra-
cies is whether military and police officers should be criminally prose-
cuted for human rights abuses they committed during the years of
* Irwin P. Stotzky is a Professor at the University of Miami School of Law. The author
wishes to thank his research assistant, Alicia'Sorondo, for her very able research, counsel, and
criticism during the completion of this essay.
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dictatorship or whether a blanket amnesty should be declared. Either
choice can lead to serious problems. In Argentina, the decision to
prosecute these government sponsored criminals sparked at least
three military mutinies during the last two years of President Raul
Alfonsin's term. 2 Brazil, which elected to forgive and forget these
atrocities, has kept its enlisted men out of the streets and in the bar-
racks, but the top military officials continue to control many of the
major governmental decisions.
Even with these problems, however, Latin America continues to
move steadily away from dictatorship towards democracy. Voters in
Paraguay recently went to the polls to elect a new president, only
three months after the overthrow of one of the most infamous dicta-
tors, General Alfredo Stroessner.4 In December, Chileans will select
a new president to replace General Augusto Pinochet5 Bolivia's
newly inaugurated president, Jaime Paz Zamora, has promised to
embark on a path of economic and social stabilization.6 Nevertheless,
the military shadow always remains in the background. Civilian rul-
ers continue to be disturbingly weak when confronted by democracy's
inherently difficult choices. To put it another way, there is a very fine
line separating democracy and oppression.
If civilian, democratic government is not effective in Latin
America, who should be blamed? Much of the fault lies with cow-
ardly, tyrannical military officials who quietly left office instead of fac-
ing up to the economic, political, and social disasters they created.
Moreover, they stepped aside without any intention of surrendering
real power or living within the dictates of a constitutional regime.
Rather, these military officials stubbornly refuse to adhere to the rule
of law while working for the inevitable collapse of civilian rule so that
they can return to power.7
2. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
3. Viola & Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980's, 38
J. INT'L AFF. 193 (1985).
4. Brooke, Paraguay General Wins Conclusively, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1989, at A5, col. 1.
On February 3, 1989 a coup overthrew General Stroessner. Ninety days later, the nation held
presidential elections even though Paraguay's lack of democratic traditions did not provide
optimal conditions for free elections. Although many irregularities did occur during these
elections, they were not of a sufficient magnitude to affect the outcome. Id. In any event, the
holding of elections, however irregular, indicates that Paraguay has entered a period of
transition to democracy.
5. Valenzuela & Constable, The Chilean Plebiscite: Defeat of a Dictator, CURRENT HIST.
129 (1989); Chile Rivals Contrast in Age, Style, Ideology, Miami Herald, Aug. 13, 1989, at 16A,
col. I.
6. See Bolivian Leftist Sworn In, Miami Herald, Aug. 7, 1989, at I IA, col. 1.
7. See, for example, the Argentine military and its reaction to the prosecution for human
rights violations, infra text accompanying notes 62-64; the Supreme Court of Argentina
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The new civilian leaders, who either made no real effort to
restrain their armed forces and educate them to become responsible
members of the new democracies, or were simply ineffective in
attempting to do so, also must accept some of the blame. In Argen-
tina, for example, the new government first aggressively prosecuted
the military and then appeased it.8 In Brazil, the government simply
appeased the military without any serious attempt to control it.9
The newly re-enfranchised citizens of Latin America are also at
fault. They have too quickly grown impatient with their democratic
leaders. For example, many citizens unjustly blame their leaders for
economic crises inherited from the dictators. They appear to want the
benefits of a democracy without paying the costs.'0
The United States and other Western nations cannot escape a
great deal of the responsibility for the weakening of these democra-
cies. While claiming to be models for Latin America's fledgling
democracies, Western nations hold the major portion of Latin
America's multibillion-dollar foreign debt. Indeed, they often push
these new democracies into economic chaos by refusing to extend
loans or by unreasonably demanding interest payments during critical
political and economic moments in the history of these new democra-
cies. These actions, of course, leave the democracies exposed to the
Opinion on the Junta trials, Causa originariamente instruida por el Consejo Supremo de las
Fuerzas Armadas en cumplimiento del Decreto 158/83 del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion (C.J.N.), Dec. 30, 1986, REVISTA JURIDICA ARGENTINA-LA
LEY (L.L.) 535, 535-97 (1987-A); the Argentine Appellate Court Opinion, Causa
originariamente instruida por el Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas en Cumplimiento del
Decreto 158/83 del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, 309 FALLOS DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE
JUSTICIA DE LA NACION (Fallos), 5, 5-1923 (1986). This opinion runs approximately 2,000
pages. [Both opinions are referred to hereinafter as Junta Opinions]. See also Human Rights
in the World: Argentina, 31 REV. INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS, 1, 5 (1983) [hereinafter
Human Rights in the World: Argentina]. Regarding the Junta's failed attempt to impose an
amnesty law for human rights violations, the Commission stated:
There can be no doubt that the aim of the military junta in passing this law
was not so much to extinguish the penal proceedings and sentences imposed for
political crimes, with the consequent release of prisoners and the return of exiles,
but to prevent any investigation from being made into the extremely serious
crimes committed over many years against life and integrity of the human person
by officials-military and police-endowed with formal authority to act, and
who did so in their official capacity, as is evident from the Final Document of the
military junta.
Id.
8. See Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, Dictatorship on Triah Prosecution of Human
Rights Violations in Argentina, 10 YALE J. INT'L. L. 118, 142-43 (1984); see also Garro &
Dahl, Legal Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step Forward and
Two Steps Backward, 8 HuM. RTS. L.J. 283 (1987).
9. See supra text accompanying note 3.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 71-79.
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real possibility of a return to military dictatorships. There is no small
hypocrisy in the demands of these Western nations."I
Perhaps it is too easy a solution to place the blame on the Latin
American civilian governments and their citizenry. As Professor Car-
los Santiago Nino points out in his article that follows, 2 the problems
in Latin American democracies are extremely complicated, and they
are interrelated to one another in incredibly subtle ways. For exam-
ple, it is clear that, in general, Latin Americans have not internalized
the importance and legitimacy of a constitutional system based upon
the "rule of law."13 Moreover, the Latin American culture appears
strongly resistant to the internalization of universal standards of
achievement and competition necessary to an equitably functioning
democracy. Rather, Latin Americans appear to have internalized a
belief in the overpowering importance of status and connections, thus
crippling the transition to a constitutional democracy. This psycho-
logical state of mind is powerful indeed. How does one instill in the
hearts and minds of people struggling for their very existence-in the
face of harsh economic realities and with the barrel of a gun in the
background-that the moral bases of a democracy must be adhered to
for their lives to improve? In point of fact, it is a distinct possibility
that the problems faced by Latin American democracies may be
insoluble.
This possibility, however, has not deterred the legions of
extremely brave and dedicated Latin Americans struggling to create
11. Indeed,.there is no small hypocrisy in the attitude of major United States banks that
control a large portion of wealthy Latin Americans' investments abroad. While many Latin
American nations are trying to lure the flight capital back to their countries, some of the
world's leading financial institutions are aggressively working to hang on to the money.
Citibank, for example, which has 7.7 billion dollars outstanding in Latin American loans, also
holds approximately 20 billion dollars of private Latin American deposits. Thus, it appears
that some of the major banks are attempting to cover possible losses on their third world loans
by soliciting private Latin American wealth. This, of course, does not have a salutary effect on
the repayment of the Latin American debt. By helping to remove the private capital from
these countries, the banks are making it extremely difficult for Latin American nations to build
up their economies, a prerequisite to the repayment of the debts. Moffett, Mexico's Capital
Flight Still Wracks Economy Despite the Brady Plan, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
12. Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin
America, 44 U.. MIAMI L. REV. 129 (1989).
13. The rule of law is a major foundation of democratic political systems. It is a call to
political justice and has remained, over the centuries, a vibrant ideal of democratic society.
The central core of this principle embodies the enduring values of regularity and restraint--of
treating like cases alike and inhibiting the arbitrary actions of government officials. These
thoughts are traditionally captured in the slogan of "a government of laws, not men." Even
with the transcendent importance placed upon this ideal by people from every shade of
political position, from the far left to the far right, however, the rule of law has come under
increasing criticism in modern society. For a collection of essays describing these attacks, see
A. HUTCHINSON & P. MONAHAN, THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY (1987).
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and perpetuate a constitutional democratic system of government.
Argentina is a particularly good example of the difficulties inherent in
such an undertaking. Carlos Santiago Nino, Professor of Philosophy
and Law at the University of Buenos Aires, and one of the principal
advisors to President Alfonsin of Argentina during his recent term, is
a particularly good example of such an heroic and dedicated person.
Before discussing his article, however, it is important to become
familiar with some of the recent history of Argentina. Indeed, Argen-
tina is an important model for an understanding of the seemingly
never ending cycles of hope and despair and the complexities facing
Latin American democracies.
II. A GLIMPSE OF ARGENTINE HISTORY
14
The people of Argentina elected Raul Alfonsin President in
1983."5 This was cause for great celebration and hope by the Argen-
tinian people. The election of Alfonsin, the leader of the Radical
Party, came after one of the darkest periods in Argentine history.
From 1976 until the election of Alfonsin in 1983, a series of military
juntas ruled Argentina. 16 They conducted a so-called "dirty war,"
allegedly against leftist terrorism, resulting in the disappearances of
anywhere between 7000 and 30,000 mostly innocent people,'7 started
and lost a war with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands, 18 and left
the country almost bankrupt with a staggering forty-five billion dollar
14. This glimpse of Argentine history has been compiled and distilled from the following
sources: Junta Opinions, supra note 7; the report on the disappeared by the Comision Nacional
sobre la Desaparicion de Personas (CONADEP), headed by the novelist Ernesto Sabato, and
published as NUNCA MAS (9th ed. 1985); J. CORRADI, THE FITFUL REPUBLIC: ECONOMY,
SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA (1985) (a succinct and enlightening appraisal of
Argentine history); H. HERRING, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA: FROM THE BEGINNINGS
TO THE PRESENT (1957) (a survey of Latin American history which devotes six chapters to
Argentina, primarily its early history); D. ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516-1982: FROM SPANISH
COLONIZATION TO THE FALKLANDS WAR (1985) [hereinafter ARGENTINA] (a scholarly work
which combines rich historical detail with incisive analysis in recounting Argentina's turbulent
four centuries of existence); D. ROCK, POLITICS IN ARGENTINA 1890-1930: THE RISE AND
FALL OF RADICALISM (Cambridge Latin American Studies No. 19, 1975) (an analysis of the
development of Mr. Alfonsin's Radical Party); A. WHITAKER, ARGENTINA (1984) (a book
focusing on twentieth century history and Argentina's arrested development); Speck, The Trial
of the Argentine Junta: Responsibilities and Realities, 18 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 491
(1987). General historical themes will not be cited to specific texts or sources. Particular
statistics and facts will be cited to specific sources.
15. Wynia, Democracy in Argentina, 84 CURRENT HIST. 53 (1985).
16. See Speck, supra note 14, at 497-500.
17. The official estimate is 8960. See NUNCA MAS, supra note 14, at 16. According to
Human Rights in the World: Argentina, supra note 7, at 1, the number may be as high as
15,000 due to underreporting. Another source estimates the number of disappeared to be as
high as 30,000. J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 120.
.18. See J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 136-45.-
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debt.'9 But this intolerable situation was simply one more swing of
the pendulum of politics in Argentina.
In the early nineteenth century, after winning its independence
from Spain, Argentina experienced alternating shifts in political
regimes from anarchy to dictatorship. In the 1860's, however, things
changed. At that time, the people of Argentina accepted the responsi-
bilities of a constitution enacted in 1853, and created and lived within
an institutional framework that allowed a stabilization of social struc-
tures, fostered economic growth and prosperity, and promoted high
levels of immigration for approximately fifty years. By the 1920's,
Argentina had a constitution that protected individual rights, a
vibrant economy, and a highly educated citizenry largely of European
origin. The Great Depression, however, changed everything. Taking
advantage of the economic misfortune and the weakened civilian gov-
ernment, a group of generals took over the government. For the next
fifteen years, the military ruled Argentina. In 1945, the charismatic
Juan Domingo Peron, a former general, took control of the govern-
ment. His movement, consisting of a bizarre combination of fascist
and leftist elements, and resting on both his and his wife Evita's
strange populist appeal, virtually destroyed the economy and made a
shambles of civil liberties. Peron was overthrown in 1955 in a revolu-
tion largely supported by the middle class and several Western
nations. His popular appeal nevertheless remained strong. From
1955 through the 1960's, civilian and military governments alternated
in power. None of these regimes, however, could solve Argentina's
economic problems. None of them could win the support of Peron's
working class adherents. Furthermore, it was during this period that
leftist insurgents gained some notoriety by carrying out assassinations
and kidnappings for ransom.
By the early 1970's, the military government allowed free elec-
tions in which all parties, including the Peronist, could take part.
They excluded only Juan Peron from running in the election. That
exclusion, however, turned out to be only a temporary setback to
Peron's return to power. A Peron crony, Hector J. Campora, won the
election, promising to turn power over to Peron. He lived up to his
promise. In March 1973, Campora resigned from office and called for
new elections. By October 1973, Juan Peron was back in power as
President of Argentina.
Peron attempted to implement economic and social programs
similar to those he offered during the 1940's and 1950's. He based his
19. Passell, The Long Road to Argentina's Financial Disaster, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1989,
at Y6, col. 3.
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reforms on appeals to nationalism and anti-imperialism. The function
and meaning of these reforms, however, were quite different than they
had been in 1946. The notion of Peronism as a coalition of somewhat
immature groups seeking the benefits of industrialization did not ring
true in 1973. Indeed, it became increasingly difficult to balance the
antagonistic interests of labor and foreign and national capital. His
policies, in effect, destroyed the economy. Furthermore, to combat
left-wing terrorism, Peron's government undertook brutal repressive
measures.
With Peron's death in July 1974, Argentina accelerated its pace
towards political disintegration. Peron had failed to create viable
institutions which would last beyond his term of office. He held the
nation together largely by virtue of his personal charisma. One can-
not, however, transfer charisma to the next leader. The precarious
institutional arrangements, missing a core of legitimacy, collapsed like
a house of cards. Argentina plunged into chaos. Peron's third wife,
Maria Estela Martinez, commonly known as Isabel, succeeded him to
the Presidency. Unlike Peron, she was neither alert nor responsive to
the pressures of the working class. Instead, Isabel and her strange
entourage concerned themselves with arcane intrigues, secret conspir-
acies, and mystical processes. ° Isabel and her small circle of advisors
became totally removed from a political society that had lost almost
all regulation. Entrepreneurs pursued their unrelenting search for
profits into a degenerating cycle of sacking and plunder, thus commit-
ting the country into economic ruin. Trade unions responded by
pushing for outrageous demands. Existing social compacts and polit-
ical understandings disintegrated. Even more alarmingly, people
themselves began to be destroyed with increasing regularity. Despite
the increase in violence, open warfare did not take place. Extremists
of both the right and the left failed in their attempts to capture the
hearts and minds of the population. Instead, violence between these
factions increased. The established social groups continued their
petty bickering, attempting to save themselves in the face of impend-
ing doom. In the end, there was nothing left for the majority of
Argentines to do but to wait for a return to the authoritarian rule of
the military. They did not have to wait long. On March 24, 1976, the
armed forces took over the government.
21
During the period between 1976 and 1983, three separate mili-
20. J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 110; see also Speck, supra note 14, at 496 (describing
Isabel Peron's reliance on Jose Lopez Rega, the Minister of Public Welfare, who in turn was
rumored to rely on astrological signs for government decisions).
21. J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 115.
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tary juntas ruled the nation. The first junta, composed of leaders of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, believed that they could transform
the very nature of Argentine society. They vowed to destroy all ter-
rorists, revitalize the economy by freeing it from state control, and
break the stalemate of social conflict. They failed in all of their goals.
Instead, their policies exacerbated the nation's already chaotic state.
The military juntas murdered a large number of "suspected ter-
rorists," and thus the regime itself became the agent of terror. During
the most intense government-terror phase, between 1976 and 1979,
the junta eliminated somewhere between 7000 and 30,000 persons.
The extermination took place under a veil of state secrecy. Most vic-
tims simply disappeared. The victims belong to the category of non-
persons because most of them were never heard of again. Their
remains are missing even today. As one author describes this brutal
process:
Each disappearance followed. a similar pattern. Civilian
authorities, such as the police, Were told not to interfere in a cer-
tain targeted area. An armed unit would burst into the victim's
house or apartment in the early hours of the morning; the attackers
carried off the victim in an unmarked car, often ransacking the
house, and always warning family members that appeals to the
authorities would be useless. The attackers then drove the victim,
usually with a hood over his head, to a clandestine detention center
where they questioned him or her, usually with torture. Victims
were held incommunicado and warned not to expect any help from
the authorities or their families. Family members were also kid-
napped and often tortured in each other's presence.
Some prisoners Were detained for years; others were tortured
to death. Most, however, simply "disappeared," prompting the
invention of a new transitive verb, "to disappear someone." Bodies
were found floating in the Rio de la Plata or buried in mass graves,
often with hands and heads cut off to prevent identification. Many
of those who died as a result of torture or executions in detention
centers were reported by the military, which had instituted press
controls, as casualties of "confrontations" between the forces of
order and armed bands. Relatives of the missing filed hundreds of
habeas corpus petitions and appealed to Argentine and other
authorities, but to no avail. Victims included the elderly, children
and pregnant women; Argentines, Uruguayans, and citizens of
other nations; students, workers, journalists, lawyers, priests, and
former cabinet ministers. Many victims disappeared, not because
they were suspected of aiding terrorist activities, but because it was
hoped that they would denounce family members who had, or
because they had submitted habeas corpus petitions or had partici-
pated in human rights organizations. Amid growing international
[Vol. 44:105
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censure, the junta denied committing any violations. 22
In 1978, a second junta took power. This junta claimed that the
war against subversion had finally been won. The number of those
who disappeared declined sharply. The economy, however, continued
to deteriorate: The national debt had increased substantially and
inflation was out of control. Moreover, border incidents with Chile
tested the patriotism of the people. In 1981, a third junta took power.
This, of course, did not help matters. All of these problems continued
to get worse. Unemployment and inflation mushroomed, the cur-
rency had to be devalued several times, and the people of Argentina
grew increasingly discontent. A majority longed for social consensus
and economic solvency. They wished for an end to senseless extermi-
nations. Change was in the air. Indeed, even established social
groups began to question the right of the regime to stay in power.
Partly as a response to these problems, and partly because of the irra-
tionality of the military leaders, the junta invaded the Malvinas/Falk-
land Islands in April 1982. The invasion ended in a disaster for
Argentina. By June, the war had been lost. The junta stepped down.
In October 1983, the people of Argentina elected Raul Alfonsin
president.
The election represented not only a symbolic break with the past,
but also a reconstitution of political forces favorable to democracy.
Extremely difficult problems, of course, faced Alfonsin. He faced the
bleak prospects of instituting civilian control over the military, refi-
nancing a monumental foreign debt, finding tolerable solutions to
international conflicts, And perhaps most importantly, bringing those
responsible for the exterminations to justice while, at the same time,
accounting for the disappeared. An assessment of the success of
Alfonsin's administration in nurturing democratic changes rises or
falls with his proposed solutions to those staggering problems and
their implementation. In the short run, however, his administration
could not resolve these monumental problems, and his Radical party
lost the 1989 presidential election to a Peronist candidate.
The history of Argentina is that of a nation caught in a never
ending cycle between hope for democracy and fear of authoritarian
rule, between social harmony and social strife. As one commentator
has so aptly stated:
Time and again the state does rise above the turmoil of civil society
and seeks to assume the agency of this erratic historicity. But each
time it seems to falter, to rapidly lose force, and then succumb to
22. Speck, supra note 14, at 498-99. For a stirring, brilliant novel that makes these
gruesome facts come alive, see L. THORNTON, IMAGINING ARGENTINA (1987).
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the tug-of-war between actors that cannot themselves rise to the
level of social movements and that remain, strictly speaking, mere
pressure groups. Thus no power appears that is great enough to
unify the whole society. Too weak to lead, each group is still
strong enough to prevent any other from doing so. Hence, though
once intellectually brilliant and culturally creative, more emanci-
pated than many other societies from the trammels of traditional
authority, Argentina nonetheless easily falls prey to political decay.
The state tends to rapidly lose whatever autonomy it may have
attained vis-a-vis civil society and to become instrumentalized, not
by a ruling class, as Marxists sometimes believe, but by a larger
plurality of narrow groups. Things then return to where they
started, namely, to the erratic behavior of a malfunctioning polit-
ical system.23
III. PROFESSOR NINO'S PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The Alfonsin government had the opportunity to build, enforce,
and guarantee a truly democratic state. Many talented and dedicated
people worked together on this project under the leadership of Presi-
dent Alfonsin. But the Alfonsin government was only partially suc-
cessful in promoting democratic changes. The important point,
however, is not whether Alfonsin achieved all of his goals, but rather
that he followed the moral imperative to make the institutions of
Argentina accountable to democratic principles.
Still, the question that haunts every attempt to reform Latin
American societies, in general, and Argentina, in particular, and
make successful a transition from dictatorship to democracy is this:
What are the forces that make a viable democracy so difficult to
implement? Professor Carlos Santiago Nino, in his article, Transition
to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin
America,24 presents an intriguing response and set of solutions to this
very question.
His analysis of the problems confronting a nation wishing to
make the transition from dictatorship to democracy and his proposed
solutions are extremely well thought out. He handles complex ques-
tions with intellectual honesty and with a keen awareness of the risks
inherent in such an enterprise, but never without hope and commit-
ment. Moreover, throughout his discussion, Professor Nino brings to
the task an intimate knowledge of Latin America and the various
social and political theories which have been applied to the process of
23. J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 112-13.
24. Nino, supra note 12.
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transition. Upon reflection, it is difficult to advance any better solu-
tions to these problems than those suggested by Professor Nino. Nev-
ertheless, there are difficulties with some of his solutions.
Professor Nino begins his article by arguing that one of the major
challenges in the process of transition from a dictatorship to a fully
consolidated democracy in Latin America is the need to dismantle the
network of privileges and relationships that special interest groups
have established during the rule of previous political regimes, particu-
larly during authoritarian and populist periods. The first section of
his article is, therefore, devoted to providing us with an essential
understanding of what he refers to as "corporatism," and its para-
lyzing effects on Argentina's transition to democracy. According to
Professor Nino, the term corporatism, as applied to Argentina,
encompasses not only the State's influence on various organizations
and interest groups, but also the reciprocal pressures that these orga-
nizations and interest groups exert on the state decision-making bod-
ies, such as legislative and administrative agencies, as a price for
political support of the regime. These so-called corporations include
the military, the Catholic Church, trade unions, the entrepreneurial
sector, and the press."
Professor Nino argues persuasively that these corporations, tra-
ditionally powerful under both authoritarian and populist regimes,
have never relinquished their influence nor their attempts to maintain
and increase their status and power, even after the restoration of
democracy to Argentina in 1983. In their efforts toward self-preser-
vation, the corporate entities exert an insidious effect on the transition
to democracy because they generate distortions in the government's
power base and contribute to inflationary crises. Thus, while inhib-
iting the progress of democracy, they strengthen the hand of
authoritarianism.
But Professor Nino does more than make allegations. As evi-
dence for his position, Professor Nino gives concrete examples. He
discusses the difficulties encountered by President Alfonsin's demo-
cratic government in attempting to punish human rights violations
perpetrated by the military during their junta rule. Similarly, he dis-
cusses and criticizes the Catholic Church's resistance to liberalization
measures affecting divorce, private drug use, and other public moral
25. Numerous critics have identified similar institutions, organizations, and interest
groups in the United States that inhibit the workings of democracy, while contributing to the
consolidation of social and economic power. See, e.g., M. PARENTI, DEMOCRACY FOR THE
FEW (1977). The existence of such groups further undermines Professor Nino's theory on the
question of voter apathy in the United States. See infra text accompanying notes 28-31.
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questions, such as censorship of publications, cinema, and theater.
Professor Nino does not, however, stop there. He also attacks the
established press, trade unions, and business interests for selfishly
opposing various measures necessary to stabilize democratic goals in
Argentina.
As the only antidote against these poisonous meddlers, Professor
Nino proposes further efforts. by the government to encourage popular
participation in the political process. He views democracy as a forum
for moral discourse where principles, rather than special interests,
prevail. He believes that the best means for countering corporative
power is to create a polity governed by universal and impersonal prin-
ciples where individual citizens, who preserve the ability to adopt new
interests and are not necessarily identified with any specific interest,
make choices in a process of public justification and dialogue. Fur-
thermore, he argues that this equality of opportunity for individual
citizens to make such choices can only be achieved through the
encouragement of free competition among political parties. More-
over, the political parties must themselves be free of the taint of cor-
ruption. They must therefore be run on the bases of principles and
programs, with active participatory members, and with an internal
party democracy whose results are strictly enforced. From this line of
reasoning, Professor Nino derives one of the major premises of his
argument: to secure democracy in Argentina it is necessary to pro-
mote and strengthen highly participatory political parties.
The validity of this premise, however, rests on several debatable
assumptions. As Professor Nino himself points out, political parties
are not immune from subversion by corporatist elites. Furthermore,
the vitality of political parties depends on their actual or perceived
ability to achieve their constituents' goals. These objectives are, by
definition, special interests. Moreover, once in power, political parties
have a tendency to assume a life.of their own; they tend to self-perpet-
uate. At such a point, even the legitimate desires of their rank and file
members may take a back seat to the party's or its leader's crude
interest in maintaining the status quo. This occurred in Argentina,
for example, when Juan Peron returned to power in 1973. At that
time, Peron named his politically incompetent and uneducated wife,
"Isabelita," Vice-president, and she succeeded him upon his death in
1974.26 The political chaos which ensued under Isabelita's rule,
which lasted until the 1976 military coup,27 might have been avoided
26. Speck, supra note 14, at 496-97.
27. Id.
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if Peron had been more concerned with building institutional integrity
and continuity rather than with personality in selecting his successor.
Professor Nino's proposed cure for these corruptive maladies
includes increased popular participation, permanent political debates,
democratic election of party leaders, and open accounting of funds.
This solution, however, suffers from an inherent contradiction: to
keep political parties free of corruption, the members must engage in
activities which are not feasible unless corruption does not exist.
Professor Nino proceeds in his analysis by expounding a seem-
ingly contradictory minor premise: A strong presidentialist system,
as dictated by the Argentine Constitution, is an anathema to the
required vigorous popular involvement in the country's political inter-
course. Indeed, according to his argument, a presidentialist system of
government tends to weaken political parties. The problem runs even
deeper. When political parties remain strong, because of diverse cul-
tural and historical factors, the difficulties inherent in the presidential-
ist system-blockages between powers, erosion of the presidential
figure, difficulties in forming coalitions-become increasingly severe.
Moreover, the pursuit of the presidential office in these highly charged
contests, he argues, leaves the winner politically exhausted. The
losers, on the other hand, waste no opportunity during the rule of the
new administration to downgrade its image, in preparation for the
next electoral battle. These problems, in turn, jeopardize the stability
of the entire system of government.
Since the Argentine Constitution of 1853, which is presently in
force, has many traits in common with the United States Constitu-
tion,2" Professor Nino finds it necessary to explain the apparent health
of the strong American presidential system. For this task, he relies on
the theories of Professor Fred W. Riggs, who attributes the survival of
the American presidential institution to low voter turnout and general
public apathy towards political contests. But, given the corporatist
phenomenon, Professor Nino is firm in his belief that Argentina can-
not afford voter apathy. Indeed, he would go so far as to support
mandatory voting, a legal requirement in Argentina since 1912.29 This
is because, in the absence of strong popular participation, the power-
ful special interests would simply smother the fragile democratic
bloom.
Weaknesses in this premise are immediately apparent. Low
28. Among these traits are a federal regime, an elected bicameral legislature, an
independent judiciary, a bill of rights, and a strong national executive. D. ROCK, ARGENTINA,
supra note 14, at 123-24.
29. J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 36.
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voter turnout is a fairly recent phenomenon in an American society
that has prospered through two hundred years of constitutional
rule.3" Moreover, it is likely that low voter turnout is a sign of a
decaying, not a vibrant, democracy.3' Furthermore, the American
presidential system has survived episodes of highly charged popular
involvement from the post-Civil War period of the mid-1800's to the
Vietnam era civil unrest of the mid- 1900's. More recently, in the mid-
1970's, the American presidential system survived one of its strongest
challenges when a vocal citizenry forced a corrupt President, Richard
Nixon, to step down from office in the face of impending impeach-
ment proceedings. In point of fact, this event seemed to strengthen,
not weaken, democracy in the United States.
It is clear, of course, that many factors, reflecting the whole
range of the American experience, have contributed to the preserva-
tion of the existing presidential system. Paramount among these is
the long-lived respect for the rule of law which pervades American
society, and which has clearly been internalized by the citizenry. Con-
versely, many factors besides vibrant political parties, and therefore
strong popular involvement, may conspire to bring down the Argen-
tine presidency, factors which are correspondingly reflective of that
nation's unique history.
Professor Nino's elegant solution to the apparent dilemma posed
by his premises is a call for constitutional reform. His proposed
30. In the period from 1840 to 1900 voter participation in United States presidential
elections ranged in the 70-80 percentiles. In this century, for the period ending in 1968, the
lowest voter turnout reported is 48.9% for 1924 and the highest, 65.4% in 1908. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION, PART 2, at 1071-72
(Table: Series Y 27-78) (1975).
31. The vitality of a democratic system of government is generally measured by the degree
and scope of citizen participation in electoral activity. If that is a correct formula for the
measurement of a democratic polity, then the political system of the United States is in deep
trouble. Indeed, the United States ranks among the least democratic states of those holding
free elections. See W. BURNHAM, THE CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1982); J.
COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY (1983). Further complicating this problem is the lack
of equality of participation. The working class voter turnout, for example, is approximately 30
percent lower than middle class turnout. For statistical information about the 1980
presidential election, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
Population Characteristics: Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1980,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 370, at 62- 64 (Table 12) (April 1982).
Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that black Americans vote approximately 20% less
often than whites. Id. at 2 (Table A).
There are, of course, a host of other factors which indicate that the American democratic
system suffers from serious maladies. These factors include, inter alia, serious problems with
the American economy, the standard of living, wealth and income distribution inequities, and
defense and foreign policy misadventures during the past four decades. For an elaboration and
explication of this theme, see J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, supra at 15-46.
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hybrid presidential/parliamentary system would theoretically be
capable of surviving the political confrontations inherent in strong
partisan electoral contests. In support of such a system, Professor
Nino recounts similar attempts at constitutional modification already
undertaken in several Latin American countries including Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Haiti, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
If the validity of Professor Nino's premises is granted, his conclu-
sion appears inescapable. Unfortunately, the institution of a parlia-
mentary system is not by itself sufficient to insure or even increase the
likelihood that democracy in Argentina will prevail. As Juan E. Cor-
radi argues in comparing the terrible period of military rule to the
present democratic state, "[t]he authoritarian state presently
undone--or in abeyance-was a particularly bleak compromise solu-
tion, not the deep source of the difficulty."32
This is not to say, of course, that institutional arrangements are
unimportant. Rather, the argument is that they are only the form and
not the substance of the problem. The Argentine people's commit-
ment to democracy and their willingness to sacrifice materially for the
sake of economic stability are the major factors in determining the
country's future. They must be willing to accept in their hearts and
minds the moral imperative of democracy, and hence the necessity of
structural changes in their political institutions. They must set aside
narrow interests for the sake of their children and their nation.
Whether and how the powers to govern are shared by a president and
a prime minister, therefore, become questions of secondary impor-
tance. Indeed, as evidenced by the relatively recent Pakistani33 and
Greek34 experiences, parliamentary rule is not necessarily a better
guard against military coups than presidential systems. Hence, while
Professor Nino's advocacy of constitutional reform is praiseworthy,
32. J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 152.
33. Pakistan had a parliamentary system of government for almost six years under Prime
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. On July 5, 1977, a military coup ousted Bhutto in the wake of
civil disturbances prompted by alleged electoral fraud. The leader of the coup, General
Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, became President of Pakistan. Subsequently, the new President had
Bhutto executed. Zia ruled Pakistan until his death in a plane crash on August 17, 1988. With
the election of Benazir Bhutto (Zulfikar's daughter) as Prime Minister on November 16, 1988,
parliamentary rule returned to Pakistan. Richter, Pakistan under Zia, 78 CURRENT HIST. 168
(1979); Crossette, Euphoria Turns to Sadness as Bhutto Struggles with Pakistan's Problems,
N.Y. Times, June 5, 1989, at A9, col. 1.
34. Greece had a parliamentary system of government under Prime Minister Panayotis
Kanellopoulos. On April 21, 1967, a military junta seized power. The Greek colonels ruled
for seven years. In 1974, the junta collapsed in the aftermath of their ill fated intervention
against Cyprus and the country returned to parliamentary rule. Evriarides, Greece After
Dictatorship, 78 CURRENT HIST. 162 (1979).
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such a measure, without more, falls short of the primary objective of
insuring the preservation of democracy in Argentina.
IV. RECENT EVENTS IN ARGENTINA
Professor Nino's article concludes by expressing both hope that
the proposed constitutional reform might be implemented and the
realization that the Peronist leaders will not necessarily agree with
reforms as extensive as he desires. Indeed, since the preparation of
the article, several events have occurred in Argentina which make it
certain that Professor Nino's reforms will not be achieved in the near
future. Moreover, these recent events, which concern electoral
results, economic problems, the continued resistance to democracy by
the military, and the disastrous responses by Argentine citizens, dra-
matically demonstrate that the historical reality of the precarious bal-
ance between hope for democracy and despair of authoritarianism
remains unabated. Wealthy people are once again sending their
money to foreign banks, military officials continue to rattle the sabre,
the economy continues its downward plunge,, and the people allow
supposed self-interest to win out over long range democratic goals.
Dispassionate analysis of these events conveys this painstaking repeti-
tion of collective self-destructive behavior which has been ubiquitous
since the founding of the nation.
A. Election Results
A comparison between the elections that brought President
Alfonsin's Radical Party to power, the two intermediate elections
held during his term, and the recent elections where the Peronist
Party won the presidency, show a steady decline in popular support
for the Radical Party. Until such time as it regains a majority of the
popular support, the Radical Party is in no position to effectuate con-
stitutional reform.
As a result of the elections held in October 1983, the Radical
Party won the presidency with fifty-two percent of the popular vote,
compared to forty-two percent for the Peronist Party and six percent
for the minority parties.35 In addition, the Radicals came away with
131 of the 254 seats (52%) in the Chamber of Deputies while the
Peronists only obtained 111 seats (43%).36 The remaining twelve
seats (5%) went to minority parties.37 At this point, the winning
party, enjoying a wide margin of support, seemed capable of carrying
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out the reforms needed to restore Argentina to the community of free
nations.
Two years later, in the mid-term elections of November 1985, the
political parties contested one-half of the 254 seats in the Chamber of
Deputies.38 The Radical Party lost only one seat, down to 130 from
131. 39 The Radicals hailed these results as a victory since they man-
aged to preserve the majority (51%) in the Chamber.' By compari-
son, the Peronist Party lost eight seats, bringing its count down to 103
(41 %).41 The gains went to minority parties, who increased their foot-
hold in the Chamber to twenty-one seats (8%).42
By September 1987, however, the tide started to turn against the
ruling party. In those mid-term elections, again for one-half of the
Chamber seats, the Radicals lost the majority. Their control
decreased to 117 seats (46%). 4 3 At the same time, the Peronists
increased their count to 108 seats (43%) and the minority parties con-
tinued their upward swing to twenty-nine seats (11%).4" It is intrigu-
ing to note that if the mixed parliamentary system proposed by
Professor Nino had been in effect in 1987, President Alfonsin's posi-
tion would have been jeopardized as a result of these elections. Unless
he could have continued to muster wide popular support, he would
have been required at this point to cede his policy making duties to a
prime minister. Since the Peronist Party did not achieve a majority in
these elections either, attempts to form a coalition government with
the increasingly powerful minority parties would have been necessary.
The effect of such changes in the government, only two-thirds of
the way into the presidential term, will never be known. It is doubt-
ful, however, that scarcely four years after emerging from the shadow
of military rule, the Argentine people would have been able to handle
the instability of a coalition government. On the other hand, the
diminishing popular support for the Radical Party in 1987 foreshad-
owed its ouster from power in the 1989 presidential elections. An
early withdrawal might have spared the country the recent economic
and social chaos, details of which are offered below. In any event, the
elections held in May 1989 yielded forty-seven percent of the vote for
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the Peronist Party.45 Although not a majority, this result was suffi-
cient to give the Presidency to the Peronist candidate, Carlos Saul
Menem, with 310 out of 600 electoral college votes.46 By contrast, the
Radicals could muster only thirty-seven percent of the vote, with six-
teen percent going to six minority parties. 7
B. Economic Data
The economy is presently in shambles. The modest gains ini-
tially achieved under the Alfonsin administration have given way to
total chaos. In 1983, President Alfonsin inherited a 45 billion dollar
foreign debt.48 By June 1989, the debt had risen to 60 billion dol-
lars,49 and no interest payments had been made since April 1988.50
No new loan funds had been disbursed since February 1989.51
In 1983, inflation was running at 600% per year.52 In June 1985,
a rise to 1900% prompted the implementation of the Austral Plan. 3
As a result of this austerity program, inflation came down to eighty-
two percent per year in 1986.-" By 1987, however, inflation was back
up to 175%." In May 1989, the rate of inflation per month was
78.5%.56 In June, it was 114%, and for the first week of July it hit
45.3%.57
Argentina has traditionally had one of the highest standards of
living among the nations of Latin America. The ravages of inflation,
however, have reduced significantly the Argentine standard of living.
The percentage of people in poverty has increased from 7.6% in 1980
45. Christian, Argentina's President-Elect in the Shadow of Peron: Carlos Saul Menem,
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Gleijeses, supra note 43, at 5.
49. Golden, Once-Prosperous Argentina Sinks to Economic Mess, Miami Herald, June 18,
1989, at IA, col. 2, 14A, col. 2.
50. Passell, supra note 19, at 6, col. 6.
51. Brooke, Argentine Hints of Early Inauguration, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1989, at A3, col.
4.
52. Gleijeses, supra note 43, at 5.
53. Id.; Passell, supra note 19, at 6, col. 5-6. The Austral Plan included "a temporary
freeze on wages, prices and exchange rates and an agreement from international creditors to
stretch out payments, plus a promise to raise taxes, curtail subsidies and resist the temptation
to finance budget deficits with the printing press." Id. The government named the Austral
Plan after the new currency that replaced the peso. Id.
54. Gleijeses, supra note 43, at 6.
55. The Coup that Cheers, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1988, at 32, 33.
56. Golden, supra note 49, at 14A, col. 5.
57. Golden, Argentine Prescribes Painful Economic Cure, Miami Herald, July 10, 1989, at
IA, col. 1, 6A, col. I.
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to twenty-five percent in 1987.58 It is currently estimated that this
number will climb to thirty percent in 1989, representing 9 million
people out of a population of 30 million.59 The minimum wage stood
at 4000 australs per month in May 1989, which represented approxi-
mately ten dollars. 6° Even though the government planned an
increase at the end of June 1989 to 8700 australs per month, this
higher amount is still below the calculated poverty line of $50.30.61
C. The Military
Some elements in the military still do not appear ready to stop
interfering with the development and operation of a democracy. Two
uprisings led by Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico haunted the Alfonsin
administration, one in April 1987, and a second one in January
1988.62 A third mutiny occurred in December 1988, under the leader-
ship of Colonel Mohammed Ali Seineldin.63 While these uprisings
were put down, the general feeling is that many of the military are not
repentant for the atrocities committed during the "dirty war."' The
Military Court, charged with cleaning its own house, refused to find
guilty those accused of human rights violations.65 Subsequently, a
civil court tried nine high ranking officers.66 In the end, four went
free, two were condemned to life imprisonment and three received
terms ranging from four and one-half to seventeen years. 67 These
meager results from prosecutions contrast sharply with the official
government report that at least 9000 people "disappeared" under the
military rule.68 Furthermore, they fall short of the hope for vigorous
prosecutions envisaged in the early days of Alfonsin's rule.
Moreover, the situation is only getting worse. The power of the
military is once again increasing. The new President, Carlos Menem,
has resurrected the military by issuing sweeping pardons for officers
accused of human rights abuses committed during the military dicta-
58. Golden, supra note 49, at 14A, col. 2.
59. Id. at IA, col. 2.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 14A, col. 1.
62. Alfonsin Tames Argentina's Colonels, For Now, EcONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1987, at 33; see
also The Coup that Cheers, supra note 55, at 32.
63. Is There No End to Argentina's Tumultuous Colonels?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 1988, at
43.
64. The Coup that Cheers, supra note 55, at 33.
65. Speck, supra note 14, at 500-01.
66. Id. at 501.
67. Id. at 503.
68. Human Rights in the World: Argentina, The Truth About the Disappeared, 33 REV.
INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS 1 (1984).
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torship. The broad pardons also cleared those officers charged with
misconduct during the Malvinas/Falkland War, and those involved
in the three military uprisings against President Alfonsin.69
But President Menem has not stopped there. He has also
mounted a concerted campaign to purge the prosecutors and judges
who saved the international reputation of Argentina by bringing to
justice the high ranking military officers responsible for the thousands
of "disappearances." It would seem that respect for the rule of law is
not a high priority for President Menem.7"
D. The People
The popular response to the economic crisis has been demoraliz-
ing. In May 1989, thousands looted 329 grocery stores for food they
could not afford to buy due to prices increasing by the hour.71 These
disturbances have been called "the worst riots in a decade."' 72 The
disorders resulted in fourteen deaths, dozens of injured people, and
1852 arrests.73 The government found it necessary to declare a thirty
day state of siege.74 While the poor and middle class people rioted, the
wealthy have followed a different path: They have taken an estimated
4071 to 5076 billion dollars out of the country as a safeguard against
further economic deterioration and a possible prelude to emigration.
In fact, reverse immigration is starting to occur just as it did in prior
periods of economic upheaval.77 At the same time, labor leaders have
not been a paradigm of cooperation in the face of economic difficul-
ties. Thirteen general strikes have been held since 1983.7s It would
appear that the old historical pattern of each group fending for itself
in the midst of crises79 recurs in Argentina regardless of the form of
government confronted with such crises.
69. Argentina Pardons Its Demons, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1989, at 26, col. 1 (nat. ed.);
Argentina Issues Broad Pardon, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1989, at 8, col. 3 (nat. ed.).
70. Neier, Menem's Pardons and Purges, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at 23, col. 2 (nat. ed.).
71. Brooke, supra note 51, at A3, col. 4.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Argentina Declares State of Siege Amid Riots Over Economic Steps, N.Y. Times, May
30, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
75. Golden, supra note 49, at 14A, col. 4.
76. Passell, supra note 19, at 6, col. 3.
77. J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 29.
78. Golden, supra note 49, at 14A, col. 4.
79. See J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 2.
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E. The New Government
President Alfonsin stepped down from office on July 8, 1989,80
five months ahead of the December expiration of his term.8' By giv-
ing up power sooner than required, Mr. Alfonsin has, in effect,
achieved the result of the constitutional reform advocated in Profes-
sor Nino's article. Mr. Alfonsin's action, however, undermines Pro-
fessor Nino's assertion that a president would not be inclined to give
up power ahead of time. This underscores the concept that substance
rather than form is what matters most in Argentina.
The present administration has done nothing to change this per-
ception. In true Peronist fashion, President Menem's campaign
played with miracle worker themes such as the biblical "Arise and
Walk, Argentina, '8 2 retaking of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands,83 and
guaranteed wage increases. 84 These empty promises, however, van-
ished when he took power."5 One of his first acts as President, for
example, was to make overtures to Britain aimed at ending their bitter
conflict over the Falkland Islands.
86
On the surface, President Menem has proceeded on a pragmatic
path in his attempt to cure Argentina's economic woes. He has
brought into his government respected businessmen and free market
economists.8 7 He has also implemented stiff wage and price con-
trols.88 This approach has been effective in reducing the rate of infla-
tion from 200% for the month of July 1989, to 38% in August.89 But
confidence building has been only a preliminary skirmish in the war
against inflation. The major battle will come when President Menem
attempts to lift wage and price controls and to implement his plan for
the privatization of roughly twenty-five state enterprises. 90
Although to some people the privatization plan shows promise,
80. Golden, Painful Economic Changes Ahead in Argentina, Miami Herald, July 9, 1989,
at 13A, col. 1.
81. Golden, supra note 49, at 14A, col. 1.
82. See Robbins, The Curious Incarnation of Juan Peron, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 14, 1988, at 46, 48.
83. Christian, Oh, What a Campaign That Was, Argentines Say, N.Y. Times, May 14,
1989, at L3, col. 3.
84. See Robbins, supra note 82, at 46.
85. See Golden, supra note 57, at IA, col. 4.
86. Golden, Peronist Adopts Gentler Foreign Policy, Miami Herald, July 22, 1989 at 2A,
col. 2.
87. Argentina's Leader Menem Will Try His Charm on U.S., Miami Herald, Sept. 24,
1989, at 13A, col. 1.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Priest, Will Argentina Simply Replace One Monopoly With Another?, Wall St. J., Sept.
22, 1989, at A13, col. 3.
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critics, even from the right, are concerned about its long-term
effects.9 In theory, removing the state from vital enterprises such as
the railroads, telephone and mail service, coal mines, harbors and the
federal mint,92 will significantly dampen corporatist influence and
help reduce inflation. Turning over these traditional monopolies to
private investors, however, only amounts to a substitution of players
and a change for the worse in the rules of the game. The political
pressures which consumers have exerted on the government to keep
down the price of state provided services will vanish under the priva-
tization plan. At the same time, the monopoly status of the new pri-
vate companies will prevent the activation of free market forces to
keep prices competitive.93 Absent the unlikely dissolution of these
monopolies,94  privatization will spell disaster for Argentina's
economy.
There are no easy solutions to Argentina's economic quandary.
President Menem may simply not have the foresight or ability to
carry out the painful austerity measures required to restore the econ-
omy to an even keel. Indeed, judging from Mr. Alfonsin's rapid
decline, harsh economic purgatives do not sit well with the Argentine
voters.
V. CONCLUSION
The general concern with parliamentary constitutional reform
demonstrates the high level of commitment to democracy attained by
the Argentine rulers under the initial period of the Alfonsin govern-
ment. Unfortunately, this administration was attempting to establish
democracy under a tremendous handicap, in effect fighting with both
hands tied behind its back. Besides the problems with the military
and other issues discussed above, the Alfonsin government inherited a
huge foreign debt requiring the implementation of unpopular fiscal
constraints. Greater tolerance on the part of lenders might have given
Mr. Alfonsin more breathing room in which to bring the country
back to economic stability. 95 As the situation now stands, although




94. The willingness of private investors to take over these money-losing enterprises may
hinge on the preservation of their monopoly status, at least initially. See id. A key player in
the privatization plan is the multinational Bunge & Born, which already owns 40 companies in
Argentina, including a petrochemical company acquired from the state during President
Alfonsin's term. Can Business Save Argentina? Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 1989, at 46.
95. Passell, supra note 19, at 6, col. 6.
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the gains from the Austral Plan,96 the country's current crisis puts the
full 60 billion dollar debt in jeopardy. Argentinian novelist and
Undersecretary of Culture during the Alfonsin Presidency, Rodolfo
Rabanal, has been quoted as wondering about his country's potential
for "Lebanonization," 97 that is, for becoming a society in complete
shambles economically, politically, and socially, in view of the current
chaos.
Even with all of this, however, there are good reasons to remain
optimistic. Free elections have been held four times in Argentina
since 1983 and an orderly transfer of power to the elected president
occurred for the first time in sixty-one years. 98 If the present eco-
nomic and social crisis subsides and the alternance of power continues
between the two major parties in Argentina, a quiet time may come
again to be devoted to restructuring the system to strengthen demo-
cratic institutions.
At the cornerstone of this effort is a core group of leading Argen-
tine intellectuals who have organized an alternative private institu-
tion, the Center for Institutional Studies (Centro de Estudios
Institucionales), to provide a forum for analyzing the broad spectrum
of issues related to democratic institutions. The core group is, of
course, intimately familiar with the questions raised in this essay
about the proposed solutions to these seemingly intractable problems.
These individuals clearly realize that attitudes must be changed before
institutional reform can hope to yield a successful democracy. They
have not been remiss about taking action to effectuate these changes.
The major solution to this dilemma is educational. The issues they
plan to address range from the study of the underlying theory of
democracy to matters of institutional design.
The Center is now in operation. An international advisory board
is working with the Argentine scholars. By sponsoring research
projects, seminars, and exchange programs, the members of the
Center hope to advance the consolidation of democracy in Argentina.
These individuals also plan to create and support a new generation of
scholars and intellectuals who will address these issues on a continu-
ing basis. Furthermore, the Center will provide a cultural resource
for politicians, civil servants, and the common citizen and thus
improve the quality of democratic discourse in Argentina. Moreover,
96. Id.
97. Golden, supra note 49, at 14A, col. 6.
98. Golden, supra note 80, at 13A, col. 1. Even this understates the significance of the
transfer of power. It was the first time in Argentine history that a president duly elected by the
people, who is the leader of a particular political party, peacefully transferred power to a new
duly elected president, who is the leader of another political party.
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the Center has established an interdisciplinary approach by combin-
ing legal, philosophical, sociological and economic analyses to the
issues under study. Special emphasis will be placed on the highest
intellectual standards and ideological pluralism. Partisan influences
will be avoided with meticulous scrutiny.
The Center should be able to carry out its mission and act as a
counterforce to the return of authoritarian rule so long as the "rule of
law" 99 is not abandoned by the Argentine people. Hope springs eter-
nal. But hope must be tempered by the reality of past experiences and
the difficulty inherent in changing the attitudes of a people who seem
strongly resistant to the attempt to transform their collective
existence.
99. See J. CORRADI, supra note 14, at 152. See generally A. HUTCHINSON & P.
MONAHAN, supra note 13.
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